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Whose Revolution Was It? Stalinism 
and the Stasi in the Former GDR 
Marc Silberman 
University of Wisconsin, Madison 
The collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe 
has led to a situation full of ambiguities. At last it seems to be 
possible to talk openly, to name the mechanisms of social 
control, to document injustice and state criminality. At the 
same time, the political and economic insecurities resulting 
from the disintegration of familiar social structures have 
narrowed the public's tolerance of alternatives to the ideol-
ogy of market consumerism and Western parliamentary 
democracy. It has become practically impossible to assert or 
even imagine anything other than real existing capitalism as 
the goal of human development. Those who do insist on 
alternatives are branded as Utopians or as Stalinists in 
disguise, a distinction which some would no longer even 
allow. 
During the last three months of 1991 I have been living in 
Berlin with the express interest of observing closely the 
consequences of what it means to have lost the collective 
project of socialism, particularly among intellectuals and 
artists. In what follows I will try to provide an initial 
description of what I perceive as some of the coordinates and 
constraints in the discussion that is just getting underway. In 
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particular, I wil l touch on the implications of the increasingly 
inflationary use of the word "Stalinism" and the fetishization 
of the Stasi to erase forty years of intellectual and cultural life 
in the GDR. These two aspects strike me as especially 
pertinent because they suggest a fatal pattern for the process 
of constructing the historical memory of the GDR after its 
demise. The continuity in the perception of victimization 
connects the defeat of 1945 and the collapse of 1989 and 
beyond: victims of Hitler and National Socialism, hostages of 
the Socialist Unity Party and the Stasi, duped and deceived 
now by the promises of unification. Here the need to 
remember (and to forget) the GDR might well replicate 
mistakes that are all too familiar in the recent German tradition 
of historical cognition. 
Stalinism has become a kind of universal explanation for 
the functioning of the GDR state with its centralized apparatus, 
endemic opportunism, authoritarian oppression and infiltra-
tion of the opposition. Yet such a general understanding of the 
phenomenon of Stalinism elides its historical specificity as 
well as its political consequences. Stalinism refers, first, to a 
series of tactics employed by Stalin to consolidate power in the 
national context of the Soviet Union (e.g. the Moscow trials 
and the reign of terror in the thirties, the Hitler-Stalin pact in 
1939 to postpone war, and the formation of the Eastern Bloc 
at the Yalta Conference) and, second, it refers after Stalin's 
death to Soviet hegemonic claims through bloody interven-
tions in popular revolts in the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia. In this context Stalinism describes a dictato-
rial system where power is exercised through a single party, 
where the state and its organs (justice, military, secret service) 
are instrumentalized for the party, and where the public 
sphere is functionalized for ideological uniformity and unity 
behind the party. Of course, this definition is synonymous 
with totalitarianism, and the social sciences have provided an 
entire taxonomy of categories and concepts that may be 
applied to right as well as left dictatorships. Moreover, some 
manifestations of totalitarian systems, such as bureaucratiza-
tion, apathy and a sense of political blockage, even seem to 
be shared with advanced capitalist societies. 
I am unsatisfied with this broad definition of Stalinism as a 
centralized, hierarchical and authoritarian system for two 
reasons. The GDR's very instability, that is, its inability to 
totalize control that manifested itself in the collapse of 1989, 
would seem to demonstrate how notions of power and 
domination must be understood in a complex way. Specifi-
cally, the GDR was not as totalitarian as the Soviet Union was 
in the 1930s and 1940s, when it faced economic isolation and 
physical threat from Nazi Germany. To be sure, the purges and 
show trials in the fifties, the cultural freeze introduced at the 
Eleventh Plenary in 1965, the silencing of critical intellectuals 
around the Biermann expatriation in 1976 all employed 
typical Stalinist procedures to pressure the critical opposition 
in the GDR: forced admissions through fear or opportunism, 
manipulation of laws to serve "higher" state needs, the sowing 
of distrust among friends and colleagues, ritualistic arrests and 
trials, and prison sentences or expulsion. Yet, to avoid the 
summary dismissal of the GDR by those who would only 
allow a moral judgment of political life, distinctions must be 
elaborated which can account for the existence of free spaces 
within the system, even of an opposition. Second, the 
identification of the GDR as a Stalinist regime errs in the other 
direction as well by hardening the boundary between Stalinism 
and communism, making it all too easy for sentimentalists to 
separate the latter's Utopian core from the deformations of the 
former. The way communism's premodern, nineteenth-cen-
tury notions of redemption fed into Stalinism's traditional 
hierarchical structures and management of human needs 
should not be ignored. 
Another consequence of defining the GDR as a Stalinist 
regime is the tendency to move one step further by focusing 
on Stalinist crimes and their victims as an historical injustice 
that cries out for moral censure and financial reparations. 
The comparison to Nazi crimes against humanity is obvious 
and has been invoked with regularity. Jürgen Fuchs's 
reference in a Spiegel article to the "Holocaust in der Seele" 
in the wake of Stasi revelations, and the comparison in a 
newspaper of a former Stasi employee turned informer to 
Serge Klarsfeld and Simon Wiesenthal are only two ex-
amples, but typical ones. The implications of such compari-
sons are more than problematic and may be illustrated most 
succinctly in the discussions surrounding the memorial at the 
Buchenwald concentration camp outside Weimar. Estab-
lished early in the GDR as a major site for documenting the 
fascist crimes against humanity, the impressive memorial 
(with a museum, a large staff, a famous commemorative 
sculpture by Fritz Cremer, etc.) typified the official historical 
interpretation of National Socialism as a fascist regime 
installed by a conspiratorial elite with the support of 
industrial capital. In this version, the victims were Commu-
nist Party members—THE antifascist resistance—who suf-
fered and were vindicated in the triumphant victory of a 
socialist Germany, the GDR. For years there had been 
international criticism of this historical distortion which left 
the Holocaust, i.e. the genocide against the European Jews, 
practically unmentioned as well as the systematic killing of 
members of other resistance and oppositional movements, 
of homosexuals, gypsies, and other discriminated groups. 
This revision, which was quickly undertaken and proceeds 
still now after the collapse of the GDR, has been displaced 
by another controversy, however, for it soon came to public 
attention that after 1945 Buchenwald continued until 1949 to 
function as an internment camp under the administration of 
the Soviet Military Authority. Witnesses have begun to 
document how political prisoners (mainly former Nazis, but 
also critical communists and social democrats) were interned 
and often died in the camp owing to the harsh conditions. 
The result is a symmetry established between the Nazi 
concentration camp and the Stalinist internment camp 
(sometimes understood as the entire GDR), while the role of 
victim and victimizer is reversed. Heirs to the silent but 
willing majority of the Third Reich now feel justified in 
demanding recognition and restitution for suffering at the 
hands of communist oppressors. If nothing else, such an 
historical twist reveals the limits to binary thinking, but also 
the inability to differentiate accidental but justified punish-
ment from arbitrary injustice. The "new" victims are caught 
in the old GDR categories of martyrs and heroes, and the line 
between innocence and responsibility disappears. 
There are symmetries between 1945 and 1989: the col-
lapse of a system of political domination, including social 
relations, norms and ideals; the elimination of its political 
structures and mechanisms; the beginning of a restorative 
period in which the citizens are relieved of their own sense 
of responsibility. Yet to trace such analogies feeds what I see 
increasingly as an historically mediated German readiness to 
blame someone else (the Other) for political deficits. In this 
instance I find differences more essential than analogies, and 
not because stressing the continuity between two totalitarian 
systems throws into question the uniqueness of the Holo-
caust. Much of the discussion about Stalinism in the GDR, 
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however, does come close to a late vindication of the recent 
Historikerdebatte by equating the victims of Nazism and 
Stalinism. In particular, for West Germans the process of 
seriously assessing GDR history opens up problems of the 
past and remembering at a point when it finally seemed as if 
postwar economic success and political stability had created 
the necessary distance to the mistakes and crimes of the Third 
Reich. For them, this repressed history had finally entered the 
safety of the museum, and its problematic aspects had shifted 
into the sphere of culture (treated ad nauseum in novels, 
films, exhibitions, etc.). 
During the fifties and sixties in the GDR, on the contrary, 
the memory of the Third Reich and the antifascist struggle 
remained in the public sphere, and not only as an instrument 
for legitimating political hegemony. The experience of defeat 
proceeded precisely through antifascist ideology; loss was 
transformed into a new identity structure by means of the 
symbolic behavior of substitution. With growing historical 
distance and the inevitable shift in generations, this frame-
work became increasingly ritualized. 
Confronted by the official image of fascism as the absolute 
evil, the SS as inhuman beasts, and West Germany as the 
historical heir of National Socialism, the younger generation 
could choose between only two possible reactions to the Nazi 
past: concern or disregard. The former led directly to the State 
sanctioned, legendary version of the past; the latter led to a 
vacuum (which since has been occupied by neo-fascist 
gangs). In other words, in the GDR, identification with the 
antifascist past blocked a critical perspective in and on the 
GDR itself. Antifascism became a moralistic excuse for the 
deficits of the present and for justifying the Cold War logic of 
ideological enemies. 
If in the former GDR "Stalinism" has converted the issue of 
responsibility into an abstraction by shifting attention away 
from the individuals who exercised it and the mentality that 
tolerated it; in the West the Stasi has become a fetish that 
implicates every GDR citizen in a web of culpability. This is 
not to say that there has been no interest in the secret police 
in the new Federal States. On the contrary, during the past 
eighteen months a veritable avalanche of confessions, mem-
oirs, interviews, and documentations of Stasi victims and 
employees has appeared, not only, but primarily in presses 
and films from the former GDR. The Stasi's power as the 
instrument of the State's bureaucratic terror is slowly being 
revealed as the systematic functionalization of personal and 
social trust for political ends. Although in the East these 
disclosures have elicited spontaneous expressions of disbe-
lief, anger, and vengeance at the scope of surveillance, in fact, 
the large majority of former GDR citizens who had no direct 
contact with the Stasi seem to consider its deeds to have been 
simply one more instance of the dependency relations that 
permeated their daily existence. In families (tight housing 
forced adult children to live with parents much longer than 
in the West), in marriages (the necessity of two incomes to 
sustain a minimum standard of living created financial 
dependencies between partners that had nothing to do with 
emotional attachments), in schools (independent thinking 
was virtually blocked in the educational sphere), and in the 
market place (goods and services were acquired through a 
complicated network of informal connections and favors), 
personal loyalties and institutional pressures defined the 
limits of social equality. And in this system these limits 
became more and more arbitrary, distorted by privilege and 
access. 
The GDR has been described as a Nischengesellschaft, a 
kind of paternalistic social contract in which the State 
maintained its power monopoly by promising efficient man-
agement in the socio-economic sphere, while the citizens 
protected their individual autonomy in apparently unpolitical 
free spaces made possible by a rising standard of living 
(family, home, hobbies, vacation, etc.). This mutual arrange-
ment was not only a survival strategy but also the basis for 
constituting a GDR identity, at least as long as the State could 
make good on its promise. As social and economic differen-
tiation grew during the eighties, new forms of passive and 
active resistance led to the dissolution of the "contract" and 
ultimately to the end of the GDR. Not unlike the typical 
middle class West German citizen, the GDR citizen's self-
image was apolitical and to a large extent defined by the 
family rather than within any larger political or social 
collective. Self-identity derived from the capacity to adjust to 
(ugly) realities, so that conformity came to be regarded as a 
talent rather than a liability. The Ministry for State Security was 
crucial in guaranteeing the state monopoly on power as well 
as the apolitical character of individual autonomy. No won-
der, then, that many GDR citizens did not and still do not 
perceive the Stasi as a constant threat or terror apparatus, 
while for many West Germans it has taken on the aura of a 
cancer that invaded the entire body politic. The virtue of 
conformity has been redefined suddenly as complicity in a 
criminal system. 
These generalizations, of course, do justice to the spec-
trum of responses in neither East nor West, but they are 
especially characteristic for the public recriminations directed 
toward intellectuals and artists from the GDR. 
At first this seems surprising to an outsider like myself, who 
appreciated any space that could be claimed by critical, 
oppositional, or dissident intellectuals. In retrospect, how-
ever, it is easy to see how these reformers came to be 
identified with Stalinism. As "socialism" came to mean no 
more than the failure of the old regime, those who had 
enjoyed its privileges and, even more so, those who still 
sought to reform it from the inside before "revolution" was 
even on the agenda, were suddenly contaminated by the 
corruption and implosion of that moribund past. Hence, 
Christa Wolf as state poet in the view of some Western critics. 
This is right, but it does not go very far. Moreover, it seems 
to reveal typically Western, market-place expectations (and 
disappointments) about artists who are supposed to function 
as metaphors for social relations, validating the possibility of 
extreme modes of existence. The relationship between 
intellectuals/artists and the "people" in the GDR, however, 
was anticipated by Stalin in the thirties already as a pedagogi-
cal one in which the former were to serve the State's need for 
stability and to be rewarded accordingly. Yet all totalitarian 
states distrust the power of the written and spoken word, and 
with good reason. If language provides access to truth, then 
it is especially important to maintain the party monopoly on 
language; this explains the elaborate systems of control in the 
publishing and public spheres. Thus, the parameters of 
intellectual life were fundamentally different in the East than 
in the West. In the GDR, intellectual and artistic contributions 
moved between the poles of loyalty (support of the existing 
power structure) and critical loyalty (its reform), whereas 
those who dared radical critique were marginalized or 
expelled with all the power of the State. The room for 
oppositional heroes within the GDR was practically nonex-
istent (cf. Havemann), while those who became oppositional 
23 3
Silberman: Whose Revolution Was It? Stalinism and the Stasi in the Former GD
Published by New Prairie Press, 1992
heroes through expulsion lost their public. Survival strategies 
were schizophrenic: private reservations and public pro-
nouncements; critical rationality and prudent accommoda-
tion; Utopian insight and intentional blindness. Indeed, talent 
in the GDR could be measured in direct relation to the distance 
between the terms of contradiction that an individual could 
abide...and express. 
Two controversies this past fall that have gained much 
public exposure indicate the new parameters being traced for 
artists and intellectuals. While many perceived the GDR 
intelligentsia as tolerated but powerful court jesters in a semi-
feudal state, in the post-GDR they are just jesters. Wolf 
Biermann's spectacular accusation about Sascha Anderson's 
longterm collaboration with the Stasi in his Büchner-Preis 
speech and the background details provided by Jürgen Fuchs 
in a Spiegel series have fueled suspicions that the entire artistic 
scene was Stasi-controlled and manipulated. Anderson had 
been identified with dissident writers and artists since the early 
seventies in Leipzig and in the eighties he became a leading 
figure in East Berlin's Prenzlauer Berg circle of young, 
explicitly nonpolitical dropouts from official GDR culture. If 
he was a Stasi mole, even after having left the GDR for West 
Berlin in the mid-eighties, then everyone else, including those 
who were victimized by the Stasi, appears suddenly as 
hopelessly gullible dupes or as potential Stasi collaborators. 
Perhaps the Stasi itself organized the opposition against the 
state! Furthermore, the complete decimation {Abwicklung) of 
all GDR cultural institutions gains a moralistic, denunciatory 
legitimacy: they were all infected by the Stasi cancer in any 
case. 
The removal by the Berlin Senate of Heinrich Fink from his 
position of democratically elected Rector of the Humboldt 
University, owing to suspicion of Stasi collaboration as 
documented by the Gauck Commission, illustrates another 
side of the equation. Professor of theology and longtime 
director of the Theology Department, Fink admitted his 
regular meetings with security police in his capacity as high 
level administrator in a state institution, but he has disputed 
accusations of having been a Stasi official. More importantly, 
Fink emerged in the past two years as an effective leader in 
the democratic reform movement of the University, stressing 
and protecting the internal efforts to transform the institution, 
rather than simply importing models and staff from West 
Germany, as has been the case in almost all institutions of 
higher education. Fink's summary dismissal without due 
process raises a number of questions ranging from the degree 
of institutional autonomy the government allows to the power 
invested in the Gauck Commission in its role of determining 
and interpreting the import of Stasi documents. I find the topic 
of personal culpability less interesting, however, than the 
symptomatic reactions on the part of the students and faculty. 
The spontaneous expression of solidarity with Fink through 
a student strike and a protest meeting of prominent intellec-
tuals at the Humboldt University represents one of the first 
occasions since the unification process began in which those 
involved have articulated their own demands based on their 
own experience. At the same time, the emotional solidarity 
has become so closely identified with the person Fink that an 
analysis of the larger issues of continuity and responsibility 
for the past is blocked. 
A widespread reaction among many of my acquaintances 
in East Berlin is resignation and melancholy: from their view 
an atmosphere charged with retribution and self-righteous 
distrust is not conducive to open, analytical discussion. I see 
this attitude as potentially the most serious block to finding 
a creative, productive approach to the past (and the present) 
because it offers its own kind of defiant pleasure for those 
who are constantly reminded of being the "losers." Undoubt-
edly melancholy is their defense against the experience of 
loss, complicated in this instance by the fact that the very 
structures and institutions for reflecting on values, identity, 
and traditions have themselves disintegrated. What seems 
like a quixotic effort by Heiner Müller to prolong the life of 
the Akademie der Künste (Ost) over which he presides is, 
then, neither an act of nostalgia nor a refusal to let go of the 
past. It is rather precisely the desperate attempt to sustain a 
public discussion between the past and the future, a bid for 
dialogue with an unsympathetic partner. Meanwhile, this 
partner—the West German public in the largest s e n s e -
defines the terms of the discussion: denunciation of GDR 
institutions and intellectuals, criminalization of "metaphysi-
cal" crimes such as believing in a socialist Utopia, exclusion 
of the guilty, and, least offensively, pure disinterest. That the 
unification process might implicate the West Germans' self-
definition as well, demanding of them an examination of 
past political behavior and values (I think, for example, of 
the anti-communist hysteria of the fifties, the Berufsverbote 
of the seventies or the smug conviction in the strength of 
their democracy) remains a moot point. 
My comments are intended to suggest how the process of 
forgetting is shaping the memory of the GDR. Re-collection 
means creating categories and defining hierarchies of impor-
tance anew after a disruption. I interpret the anxieties that 
have surfaced during the transition as a good sign; they are 
an appropriate affect of loss and disorientation. The problem 
I foresee is that the partner in this process, the empathetic 
witness who helps constitute the public context of response 
to the rupture, refuses to participate in a fruitful way. At this 
point, then, I am especially concerned that the revolutionary 
events from September 1989 to March 1990 may be smoth-
ered by a legalistic or moralistic discussion of Stalinism and 
the Stasi. Too frequently I hear the dismissive comment that 
a relatively small number of people toppled the SED, that 
Gorbachev and Kohl were the main agents of change or that 
the revolutionary goals were coopted by greed and election-
eering. As a result, the unique emotional experience of 
participating in revolutionary change is being displaced by 
a kind of ideologically defined patience or passivity. Yet, if 
historical memory plays any role in determining future 
political decisions, then precisely the emancipatory move-
ments of the past are a crucial component of that memory, 
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